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This is a guest post by Kari Hong* and Philip L. Torrey.**
Many are surprised to learn that crime-based deportations[1] do not necessarily make
intuitive sense. Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA)[2], a misdemeanor drug o ense for which probation was imposed 20 years
ago can be an “aggravated felony,” a category reserved for the presumably most serious
o enses that result in detention, deportation, and denial of most forms of immigration
relief. But a felony conviction for kidnaping may have no consequences at all.
 U a
The crime of “child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” removal ground created by
IIRIRA similarly leads to illogical results.[3] This deportability ground,  rst created in 1996
by IIRIRA, is causing federal circuit courts (and arguably the Board of Immigration Appeals
itself) to split over whether this deportability ground is narrow or broad. We contend that
the narrow interpretation, best defended by the Tenth Circuit, is the proper one. Not only
does the legislative history support a narrow reading, but the ground’s broad
interpretation adopted by the Second Circuit improperly includes civil actions (not just
crimes) and does not even require acts that cause injury to a child. As a result, the broad
interpretation sweeps too far. It includes parents with civil violations for leaving their child
unattended, either out of circumstances arising from the lack of child care for the working
poor or from deliberate parenting choices known as “free-range” parenting in which
children are encouraged to function independently and with limited parental supervision.
The deportability ground should be interpreted narrowly—as intended by Congress— to
trigger deportation only for those who are harming and preying on children.
We contend that Congress meant to attach immigration consequences to the narrow
de nition and limit its reach to crimes involving harm to a child when enacting IIRIRA. It
may at  rst seem counterintuitive to defend those who have committed crimes from
deportation. After all, isn’t the threat of immigration, at least as explained by President
Trump, the fact that “rapists” and “murderers” are crossing the border to harm U.S.
citizens?[4] But just as the fear of rape was wrongfully used to justify slavery and
segregation, so too is the fear of rape being used to wrongfully defend the deportation of
immigrants, even those who have committed crimes.[5] This is true, as we will explain,
even for those accused of child abuse crimes.
We have to look critically at how categories of deportable crimes are de ned because
Congress made a deliberate policy choice in 1996 to deport in broad strokes—based on
categories of crimes alone—rather than through individual assessments on a case-by-case
basis. When Congress opted for this route, it ended its earlier policy of letting an individual
judge decide if a second chance or deportation was appropriate by weighing aggravating
circumstances concerning a criminal act—the seriousness of the o ense (What did the
person do? How long ago?), the character of the o ender (Is there rehabilitation or
reform? Is a there a risk of reo ending?)—against mitigating factors—family ties in the
United States, lengthy residence, a track record of community service.[6] Congress ended
these individualized hearings based on a desire to more quickly deport as many people as
possible with any criminal conviction.[7] As a result, all o enses that fall within certain
categories—aggravated felonies, crimes involving moral turpitude, controlled substance
o enses, etc.—will render an individual deportable, regardless of the individual
characteristics of the o ender and the seriousness of the o ense as determined by the
prosecutor and state court adjudicating guilt and imposing punishment.
Arising from both overly broad categories of deportable o enses and the foreclosure of an
individualized analysis, existing immigration policy then assigns the same dire, lasting
consequences to both serious o enses and dangerous o enders as to minor crimes and
rehabilitated individuals. Because of the potential real-world impact of overinclusive error,
the Supreme Court presumes that a non-citizen has committed the “least of the acts”
necessary for a conviction.[8] But this presumption does not, by itself, correct for all
overinclusive error that results in crime-based removals.
While overinclusive errors that arise for drug o enses or petty theft invoke quick
sympathy, the public seems to presume that anyone convicted of the crimes of child abuse
or child neglect deserves as harsh a penalty as possible. But a more complete
understanding of the “crime of child abuse” legal de nition challenges that presumption.
The laws in several states have evolved over the past two decades to pursue the protection
of children with increasing—at times excessive—rigor. Today, states often have expansive
de nitions of what constitutes child abuse and, in particular, child neglect. In the civil
context, neglect can trigger child protective services investigations and remedial parenting
interventions, rather than jail time. It then is particularly perverse that civil adjudications
that have the express goal of family preservation are used—in the broad interpretation of
what constitutes child abuse crime—to cause deportation, an act that permanently
separates parents from their children.
Additionally, criminal de nitions of neglect have expanded well-beyond prior iterations. In
contemporary civil and criminal statutes, terms like “child neglect” often are overinclusive
in three distinct ways that result in punishment of not only demonstrably poor parenting
but also target women who are themselves victims of domestic violence, the working poor,
or responsible parenting decisions that fall under the “free-range” child-rearing
philosophy.
First, contemporary child abuse laws sweep in conduct that often arises from a parent’s
own abuse or poverty, and not predation. In 1999, Minnesota enacted legislation requiring
a child’s exposure and proximity to domestic violence to be “a statutorily speci ed form of
reportable child abuse and neglect.”[9] The result, however, was “a dramatic increase in
the number of referrals, emanating mainly from law enforcement o cials who responded
to reports of domestic violence and, as mandated, reported the family to child protective
services.”[10] “Parents, primarily mothers, who themselves were victims of domestic
violence thus became the subjects of neglect reports based on their alleged failure to
protect their children from exposure to the violence.”[11] Although Minnesota repealed its
law when it realized the unintended consequences, similar o enses under now-existing
laws remain.[12] The new rule established by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in
Matter of Soram, 25 I. & N. Dec. 378 (2010), requires the “crimes of child abuse” removal
ground to be interpreted without regard to injury, which will, in some states, sweep in
mothers of children who are the victims of domestic violence alongside a child predator.
Second, as noted in a formidable dissent by Judge Wardlaw of the Ninth Circuit, some child
neglect and endangerment statutes reach “conduct driven by poverty, such as leaving a
child at home alone while a parent leaves for a brief errand or unintentionally failing to
secure a babysitter for a child while the parent is at work.”[13]
Third, parents who have adopted the “free-range” parenting philosophy and therefore may
permit their child to walk outside alone or play without supervision have been investigated
by child services for, and criminally charged with, child neglect and endangerment. In
Maryland, for instance, a family engaged in “free-range parenting” was twice investigated
for civil neglect when they permitted their ten- and six-year-old to walk home from a park.
[14] In Montana, a mother who dropped o  her children at the mall was criminally charged
with child endangerment.[15] In Florida, a woman who permitted her seven-year-old to
walk half a mile home from a park was arrested and charged with felony neglect.[16]
Broadly de ned child abuse and neglect state statutes are subsequently swept into a
broadly de ned crime of child abuse deportability ground thereby exacerbating the
problem of rendering minor o enses and responsible parenting decisions deportable
o enses. Both the BIA and federal appeals courts are now struggling to determine what
crimes should fall into the category of “child abuse, child neglect, and child abandonment”
deportability ground.[17] In 2008, the BIA  rst de ned the “child abuse” deportability
ground in Matter of Velazquez-Herrera to be narrow, requiring intentional mistreatment
toward a child.[18] Shortly thereafter, the BIA switched course and opted for a broad
de nition in Matter of Soram,  nding that the crime of child abuse deportability ground
“denotes a unitary concept” and de ned that concept by reference to civil laws extant in
2009.[19] In so doing, the BIA  rst held that the deportability ground did not require actual
injury to a child.[20] The Eleventh Circuit deferred to the BIA’s expansive interpretation as
reasonable.[21] But, in 2013, the Tenth Circuit, in Ibarra v. Holder, disagreed, contending
that the generic de nition of a “crime of child abuse” involves only crimes requiring injury
to a child—not civil o enses—of child abuse, neglect, and abandonment.[22]
In July 2018, in a 2-1 decision, the Ninth Circuit weighed in with Martinez-Cedillo v. Sessions,
agreeing with Soram’s broad interpretation of the crime of child abuse deportability
ground to include o enses that do not require injury to a child.[23] But an impassioned
dissent by Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw argued that “Soram is overbroad and an
unreasonable interpretation of congressional intent.”[24] This dissent convinced enough
judges to vacate Martinez-Cedillo, but before the en banc hearing arose, the client tragically
died, temporarily preventing the Ninth Circuit judges from deciding which de nition was
the correct one.[25] In June 2019, in Matthews v Barr, the Second Circuit rea rmed its prior
position that Chevron deference is owed to Soram.[26] There is now a potential en banc
review of Matthews v. Barr, which could add to the current split amongst circuits about the
proper interpretation and scope of the crime of child abuse deportability ground.
This article weighs into the debate by siding with Ibarra v. Holder’s more limited
interpretation of what o enses should be considered crimes of child abuse and thus result
in immigration consequences. The most reasonable interpretation of the crime of child
abuse deportability ground is a narrow one, which requires a criminal conviction that
involves injury to a child.
Speci cally, the text of the amendment that resulted in the crime of child abuse
deportability ground, as well as remarks by the amendment’s co-authors, establish that
the deportability ground was intended to target individuals whose criminal acts necessarily
resulted in injury to a child’s physical, mental, or emotional wellbeing. What Soram got
wrong was its presumption that child abuse, neglect, and abandonment are static terms,
instead of de nitions that shift quickly to re ect changing parenting trends and, at times,
cultural norms that re ect animus towards certain groups instead of concern for children.
Consequently, contemporary de nitions of child abuse and endangerment was
unforeseeable to Congress when it enacted the crime of child abuse deportability ground.
As a result of Soram, there are now a number of less serious o enses—civil and criminal—
that may result in removal yet require no injury to a child, no intent to harm, and no
persistent neglect of a child’s basic needs. Those “endangerment” and neglect o enses
should not be confused with the crimes of child abuse, child neglect, and child
abandonment that Congress intended to punish with removability.
I. A NARROW DEFINITION OF A “CRIME OF CHILD ABUSE” AVOIDS SWEEPING IN
CONTEMPORARY NEGLECT AND ENDANGERMENT OFFENSES THAT ARE NOT LIMITED
TO SERIOUS AND CRIMINAL MISCONDUCT.
Unlike criminal sentences, which are imposed based on the seriousness of a crime and
depravity of an o ender, civil collateral consequences for prior criminal o enses are not
tailored to the criminal justice goals of retribution or rehabilitation. The sanction of
deportation (and its updated technical term “removal”), which often results in the loss of
family, community, and country for long-term residents—is frequently disproportionately
harsh for past criminal o enses that the prosecutors and sentencing courts did not deem
serious or even deserving of prison terms.
The breadth of contemporary neglect and endangerment statues—civil and criminal—do
not reach just bad parenting decisions. They reach arguably either good parenting
decisions, advocated by “free-range” parents who encourage children to engage in self-
reliant conduct of playing and walking home unsupervised, or working parents who are
prosecuted for leaving their child unattended while working or running errands. If the
crime of child abuse deportability ground is not limited to crimes that result in injury, then
individuals could be deported for those types of prosecutions targeting the working poor
or free-range parenting. A review of contemporary civil and criminal statues supports a
narrow de nition of the crime of child abuse deportability ground such that it includes
only criminal o enses that necessarily involve injury to a child.
A. Collateral Consequences, Including Removal, Are Not Related To The Goals Of Criminal Justice.
Criminal statutes target a bad act for sanction and, by design, capture a range of conduct
from predatory serious injuries to near-misses arising from understandable mistakes. The
criminal codes use the various mental states—intentional, knowing, reckless, and
negligence—to grade certain o enses. The prosecutors are empowered with discretion to
charge and o er appropriate pleas. The judges are tasked with imposing appropriate
sentences, usually ranging from probation to multi-year prison terms. The criminal justice
system then is supposed to tailor the appropriate charge and sentence to  t the o ense
and o ender,[27] which is meant to result in lengthy sanctions for predators and second
chances to those who show potential for rehabilitation.
A dysfunction within immigration law—and all other forms of civil law that attach collateral
consequences to criminal convictions—arises because civil law was never meant to protect
the public. It cannot, it does not, and it need not. The criminal justice system, in theory, is
designed to incapacitate individuals it deems truly dangerous, either through incarceration
or rigorous post-release supervision. Collateral consequences, which are imposed by
federal, state, and city governments rather than courts, prevent people from getting
housing, employment, student loans for education, and public assistance for disabilities or
medical care for criminal convictions, including the loss of housing, employment. Those
types of consequences are not designed to protect the public from truly dangerous
individuals.[28]
By de nition, collateral consequences attach a more serious sanction than the level of
punishment that the criminal court deemed appropriate. When this occurs, collateral
consequences become overinclusive and often arbitrary. For instance, in 2016, when
sentencing a woman for a felony drug o ense, a federal district court judge rejected the
advisory sentence of 33 to 41 months in prison.[29] He instead granted probation to avoid
what he called a “civil death,” arising from the 50,000 collateral consequences collectively
imposed by state and federal law on those who committed a felony.[30] These collateral
consequences—imposed by federal, state, and city governments rather than courts—
prevent people from getting housing, employment, student loans for education, and public
assistance for disabilities or medical care.
IIRIRA has exacerbated the overinclusive reach of crime-based deportations by choosing to
assign consequences based on the categorical approach instead of individualized
hearings. IIRIRA’s policy choice—as many judges have noted—runs counter to the nuanced
and careful work of the criminal law.[31] For clari cation, the problem is not the
categorical approach, which simply requires determining whether the language of a
violated criminal statute matches a deportability ground. Instead, criticisms should be
directed both toward impermissibly expansive deportability ground interpretations that
result in over inclusivity and toward a Congress that refuses to permit individualized
hearings in which individuals facing removal may present mitigating evidence such as
proof of rehabilitation. In fact, President Trump recently explained that he does not want
to hire more immigration judges because giving an immigrant a hearing provides an
opportunity for them to prevail in their cases, an opportunity he wants denied
categorically.[32] IIRIRA is predicated on the same faulty logic: individualized hearings will
allow people with past convictions to remain in the United States. But to be clear, if the
presentation of mitigating evidence in an individualized hearing results in granting a
second chance, perhaps that in fact is the proper result.
As cited in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr,[33] under the legal regime
repealed by IIRIRA, around half of all people with real “aggravated felonies”—more serious
o enses like drug tra cking, murder, and  rearms tra cking for which a court had to
impose punishment—were granted the now-repealed INA § 212(c) relief, which allowed for
an individualized review of mitigating circumstances such as rehabilitation. Giving people
who have been convicted of crimes a second chance is even more politically palatable
today than ever before.  As more people realize that the “Tough on Crime” era resulted in
racial-bias, overzealous prosecution, and wasted resources that only promoted recidivism,
relying on a conviction alone as a marker of bad character or future dangerousness is in
doubt.[34]
What’s clear is that after 20-years of implementation, the IIRIRA approach is a failed
experiment. By eliminating individualized hearings in which an individual’s mitigating
circumstances may be considered, IIRIRA’s fatal  aw becomes its presumption that any
relief a orded to those with criminal convictions is somehow misguided. To the contrary,
IIRIRA’s decision to end hearings and no longer consider mitigating evidence had resulted
in disproportionate outcomes and overinclusive error.
As a result, when construing the reach of categories of crimes that trigger deportation—in
this instance, the meaning of a “crime of child abuse” deportability ground—one must
remember that there are no longer individual hearings to determine whether removal is
appropriate in a speci c case. Therefore, the interpretation must be grounded on the
recognition that a number of non-serious o enses and non-dangerous o enders will be
swept up if the “crime of child abuse” deportability ground is interpreted broadly.
B. Civil And Criminal Schemes That Respond To Child Abuse, Neglect, And Endangerment Have
Evolved And Expanded Over Time.
Contemporary de nitions of “child abuse,” “child neglect,” and “child endangerment,” have
expanded over time. In part, that expansion can be explained by shifting norms and a
greater understanding of crimes involving children. But, many current laws are less about
the protection of children and more about in icting humiliation on groups deemed
undesirable by the larger society.
For example, it took many years and cultural shifts to convince the public that “the vast
majority of child sex abusers are either members of the child’s family or family friends and
acquaintances,” rather than strangers.[35] For instance, in the 1980s, the public was
captivated by milk cartons advertising the fear of violent kidnappings and disappearances
by strangers, even though—then as now—a child is at greater risk of harm by an adult
known to them, a family member or adult in her inner circle of trust.
Child neglect has a darker history of targeting perceived inferior groups instead of
protecting children. In the 1970s, “approximately 25 to 35% of all Native American children
were removed from their families, and 85% of those children were placed in homes with
white parents.”[36] The state agencies removed the Native American children after
diagnosing the parents as being neglectful or abusive. But according to a 1978 House of
Representatives Report, 1% of the removals were in response to child abuse and the
remaining 99% of the removals were on the grounds of “neglect” or “social deprivation,”
which were the charges social workers made in response to the perceived emotional
damage that a child was receiving by being “subjected to [] living with their [Native]
parents.”[37]
Child neglect statutes also have mirrored shifts in parenting trends. For example, the rise
and in uence of “helicopter-parenting,” a parenting style now criticized for being over-
protective, ushered in a number of state statutes that de ned “abuse,” “neglect,”
“abandonment,” and “endangerment” without regard to injury or intent.[38] Conversely,
the increasing use of parenting styles that encourage child independence, such as those
styles discussed below, have been unfairly swept into outdated state de nitions of neglect
that may ultimately trigger deportation. That type of harsh consequence underscores
Soram’s expansive and overinclusive interpretation of the crime of child abuse
deportability ground. In its decision, the BIA fails to appreciate how contemporary civil and
criminal laws evolved from earlier iterations in e ect in 1996.
C. Expansive Contemporary De nitions Of Child Abuse, Neglect, and Endangerment Reach Both
Unintended Consequences And “Free-Range” Parenting Decisions.
Contemporary state statutes aimed at preventing child abuse and neglect—many of which
are being swept into the child abuse deportability ground—are not limited to punishing
serious misconduct. Many states, for example, have mandatory reporting statutes
designed to alert (often civil) authorities to both outright abuse and more general,
dangerous situations within a home.[39] Accordingly, many states now have “more
expansive de nitions of the conduct that legally constitutes child abuse and neglect for
purposes of mandatory reporting.”[40]
There are downsides to the expanded de nitions. For example, in 1999, Minnesota
enacted legislation to require that a child’s exposure and proximity to domestic violence
become “a statutorily speci ed form of reportable child abuse and neglect.”[41] The result,
however, was “a dramatic increase in the number of referrals, emanating mainly from law
enforcement o cials who responded to reports of domestic violence and, as mandated,
reported the family to child protective services.”[42] “Parents, primarily mothers, who
themselves were victims of domestic violence thus became the subjects of neglect reports
based on their alleged failure to protect their children from exposure to the violence.”[43]
Because that was not the intent of the law, Minnesota repealed that provision.[44]
But similar convictions under current laws remain. The Soram rule—interpreting “crimes of
child abuse” without regard to injury, and looking to de nitions like Minnesota’s above—
may result in mothers who are the victims of domestic violence being deported alongside
an irredeemable predator of children. For instance, both Texas and Oklahoma prosecuted
battered women for child neglect when they are present when their abusers also harm
their children.[45]
Classifying one of these contemporary, domestic-violence based endangerment or neglect
statutes as a removable “crime of child abuse,” as Soram would do, is of great concern. Not
only does it trigger removal, but it will make some victims of domestic violence ineligible
for relief—such as the special-rule of cancellation of removal—that is designed to protect
certain battered spouses.[46] It may also have a chilling e ect on the reporting of domestic
violence.
In addition to punishing domestic violence survivors, expansive criminal neglect laws can
encompass parenting decisions designed to promote self-reliance and independence in a
child. For example, in 2015, a white, middle-class Maryland couple that made the
conscious choice to teach their children self-reliance by letting them play in a park and
walk home without supervision were twice investigated for violating Maryland’s civil child
neglect law.[47] The public outcry led to the state agency issuing a clari cation memo that
their existing child neglect law should be interpreted more narrowly than the language
suggests.[48] But that clari cation was not codi ed in o cial regulation or law. Had one or
both parents been a non-citizen and convicted of child neglect—even though the children
were not harmed at all—they may have been deported based on the BIA’s interpretation
of the crime of child abuse deportability ground in Soram.
Maryland is not alone. Other states criminally prosecute parents who make similar
parenting decisions. In Montana, in 2009, a mother was criminally charged with
endangerment after dropping o  her children “for a few hours at the local mall.”[49] The
youngest child was three, but the child was under the supervision of two twelve-year old
children who had taken certi ed babysitting classes.[50] In Florida, in 2014, a mother was
arrested and charged with felony neglect for letting her seven-year-old walk home from a
park, which was half-a-mile away.[51] Because Florida has no minimum age for a child to
be left alone, in 2015, two parents were charged for felony neglect when their 11-year-old
was locked outside the house for 90 minutes before the parents returned home.[52]
Indeed, only one state—Utah—has decriminalized “free-range parenting,” by changing
their de nition of child neglect to exclude decisions by parents to “let[] their child walk
outside alone, play without supervision or allow[] them to wait in the car without an
adult.”[53]
The working poor who engage in “free range” parenting out of necessity are also subjected
to civil and criminal consequences based on statutes that lack an injury or mens rea
element. As recognized by Judge Wardlaw, crimes that do not require an injury will impact
the working poor, and working mothers in particular.[54] Some child neglect and
endangerment statutes reach “conduct driven by poverty, such as leaving a child at home
alone while a parent leaves for a brief errand or unintentionally failing to secure a
babysitter for a child while the parent is at work”.[55] A prominent example of this is
Ibarra, in which the non-citizen was a mother who was prosecuted for abuse when she
went to work and left her children in the care of an adult, who unbeknownst to the
mother, left the children unattended.[56] Outside of the immigration context, in 2014, a
mother in South Carolina was charged under a felony statute sounding in abandonment
and endangerment when she let her nine-year-old daughter play in a nearby park while
she worked her shift at McDonald’s.[57] In 2015, an Arizona homeless mother was
prosecuted for child abuse and sentenced to 18 years of probation for leaving her children
in the car while she interviewed for a job.[58] In each of these examples Soram would
render the prosecuted individuals removable despite the fact that none of the charged
crimes required any type of physical, emotional, or psychological harm to a child.
D. It Is Particularly Perverse To Use Civil Adjudications, Which Promote Family Uni cation, As A
Basis for Deportation, Which Results In Family Separation.
It is signi cant that Congress opted to de ne the crime of child abuse deportability ground
as involving “crimes,” rather than all forms of child abuse and neglect that are also
adjudicated in civil forums. The focus on criminal sanctions with respect to child abuse is
an important one. As explained in Ibarra, civil adjudications involving child neglect and
child endangerment also exist and “the purpose of civil de nitions is to determine when
social services may intervene. The purpose of criminal de nitions is to determine when an
abuser is criminally culpable.”[59]
That distinction is not academic. A person who preys on children is a child abuser, subject
to criminal law’s severe sanctions of incarceration, incapacitation, and a lengthy, if not life-
long sanction to civil commitment and sex o ender registrations requirements.[60] But a
person who is adjudged guilty of various child endangerment or child neglect o enses in
the civil and family context becomes part of a system in which a parent is encouraged,
e orts are made, and reforms are attempted with the goal of having the parent stay united
with their child who was the subject of the civil action. In this context, “an essential goal of
social services is family preservation,” which is why many state courts follow policies to
provide services  rst to a family in crisis.[61]
For example, in a recent New York action, before determining whether the court should
terminate parental rights, the state court  rst reviewed whether the social services agency
met “its initial burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that it exercised
diligent e orts to strengthen the parental relationship between the mother and the child
by, among other things, developing an appropriate service plan, scheduling regular
parental access between the mother and the child, and referring the mother to programs
for substance-abuse treatment.”[62] State child protection services that are witness to the
dynamics, causes, and cures for child abuse opt for policies “that respect[] the family unit
as an essential social building block and commits substantial resources to supporting it
through crisis. . . .”[63]
Civil adjudications of child endangerment and neglect actions then are predicated on
family uni cation e orts. Child abuse criminal statues, by contrast, seek the separation of
the abuser from the child. It is particularly perverse then for a crime-based deportation
ground—one that exiles a parent from a child—to sweep in the civil adjudications that are
predicated on the goal of family uni cation and preservation. In the poignant words of
Judge Wardlaw who argued against the (then) majority’s decision that a rmed
deportation, “It should not be lost on us that, while we fault [the non-citizen] for
endangering his son, we simultaneously condone the separation of a family, exiling a
father of two children who has resided in the United States lawfully for more than twenty-
 ve years.”[64] Although Judge Wardlaw was speaking to deportation based on a criminal
o ense for child endangerment, those words summarize why civil adjudications for child
abuse should not be included in the de nition of what constitutes a crime of child abuse in
immigration law.
These modern civil and criminal de nitions of child abuse and neglect sweep in domestic
violence survivors as well as parents making good child-raising decisions that are
unrecognizable to what Congress understood as child abuse more than two decades ago
when it created the crime of child abuse deportability ground. The broad reach of many
contemporary state de nitions of abuse, neglect, and endangerment support rejecting
Matter of Soram’s expansive de nition of a “crime of child abuse” that does not require
injury. Congress clearly did not intend to sweep those types of expansive statutes—most
of which did not exist in 1996—into the crime of child abuse deportability ground.
II. The Crime of Child Abuse Deportability Ground was Not Intended to Include
O enses that Do Not Require Injury to a Child.
Despite its broad interpretation by some courts, the crime of child abuse deportability
ground was designed to narrowly target individuals who prey on children and cause them
harm. The deportability ground’s legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended
it to apply to individuals who viciously assaulted children and caused them physical,
psychological, or emotional harm. But courts have become increasingly divided about
whether the deportability ground encompasses crimes that involve no injury to a child.
Any interpretation that does not require injury is a signi cant departure from the
legislative purpose of the deportability ground.
In 1996, Congress introduced the crime of child abuse deportability ground designed to
trigger the deportation of anyone “convicted of . . . a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or
child abandonment.”[65] The provision (“Coverdell-Dole amendment”) was authored by
Senators Paul Coverdell (R-Ga) and Robert Dole (R-Kan) in an amendment to the House bill
that would later become the Illegal Immigration and Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996.[66] Section 218 of the Coverdell-Dole amendment, which included the
relevant removal provision, was entitled “Exclusion Grounds for O enses of Domestic
Violence, Stalking, Crimes Against Children, and Crimes of Sexual Violence.”[67] By using
the term “against,” Congress clearly meant the deportability ground to target criminal acts
in opposition to or in hostility toward children.[68] Criminal conduct that doesn’t require
injury to a child, such as child endangerment, cannot reasonably be considered to be
“against” a child.
Although Congress did not de ne the term “crime of child abuse” in the statute, comments
from the removal provision’s authors further suggest that it was designed to target
individuals convicted of crimes that necessarily entailed acts of violence against children.
In his remarks on the Senate  oor, then-Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole elaborated on
the goal of the crime of child abuse removal provision:
[O]ur society will not tolerate crimes against women and children. The criminal law should
be a re ection of the best of our values, and it is important that we not only send a
message that we will protect our citizens against these assaults, but that we back it up as
well. . . . When someone is an alien and has already shown a predisposition toward
violence against women and children, we should get rid of them the  rst time.[69]
After the amendment passed, Dole praised his colleagues for adopting legislation that he
considered critical to “stop[ping] the vicious acts of stalking, child abuse, and sexual
abuse.”[70]
Senator Coverdell echoed his colleague’s remarks and noted that the provision was
needed to “protect . . . children.”[71] He went on to explain that “[i]nvestigations by State
child protective service agencies in 48 States determined that 1.12 million children were
victims of child abuse and negligence in 1994.”[72] The  gure represented a 27 percent
increase since 1990 in the number of children “found to be victims of maltreatment”
according to Coverdell.[73] He further noted that “[a]mong the children . . . for whom
maltreatment was substantiated or indicated in 1994, 53 percent su ered negligence, 26
percent physical abuse, 14 percent sexual abuse, 5 percent emotional abuse, and 3
percent medical negligence.”[74] Clearly the purpose of Coverdell’s amendment was to
target individuals convicted of o enses that necessarily require a child to be  physically,
emotionally, or psychologically harmed. It was not meant to target individuals convicted of
endangerment-type o enses that, although they may result in injury to a child, do not
require any such injury. After its enactment, the crime of child abuse deportability ground
went unde ned by courts or the BIA for years. In 2008, the BIA issued its  rst precedential
decision interpreting the deportability ground.[75] In that case, the BIA reasoned that by
enacting the deportability ground, “Congress clearly intended to single out those who have
been convicted of maltreating or preying upon children.”[76] Its decision suggested that a
conviction must necessarily involve some type of harm against a child for it to trigger the
deportability ground. The following year, the Ninth Circuit relied on the BIA’s new
de nition when it likewise interpreted the crime of child abuse deportability ground to
require some type of harm to a child.[77]
But in 2010’s Soram decision, the BIA changed directions and held that as long as there
was a “reasonable probability” that a child may be injured in the course of committing an
o ense, the crime of child abuse deportability ground was satis ed.[78] The BIA’s tortured
analysis relied heavily on a recent survey  nding a majority of states had civil child abuse
and neglect statues that did not require injury to a child.[79] The BIA inexplicably relied on
that 2009 survey of civil statutes to determine what Congress meant when it  rst premised
removal on crimes of child abuse in 1996. The BIA’s interpretation thus went well beyond
the deportability ground’s intent and the plain meaning of its text. Nonetheless, as
discussed above, some courts have deferred to the BIA’s expanded interpretation as
reasonable.[80]
Conversely, other courts have recognized that the BIA’s de nition is impermissibly
expansive. For example, the Tenth Circuit recently criticized the BIA’s broad interpretation
of the crime of child abuse deportability ground noting that, in light of the Board’s
expansive de nition, the deportability ground was quickly becoming unconstitutionally
vague.[81] The court further chastised the BIA for relying on a survey of civil o enses to
interpret a crime-based deportability ground.[82] Most recently, judges in the Ninth Circuit
have echoed the Tenth Circuit’s concerns, setting up a pending petition for review en banc
and potentially adding to the current split amongst circuits about the proper interpretation
of the crime of child abuse deportability ground.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Supreme Court may weigh in on the meaning of the crime of child abuse
deportability ground. If the Second Circuit reviews its decision in Matthews v. Barr and
subsequently declines to accord Matter of Soram deference, then the division amongst
circuit courts about the proper interpretation of the child abuse deportability ground will
deepen.
The Supreme Court may resolve that split and ultimately decide what conduct Congress
intended the crime of child abuse deportability ground to cover. In so doing, the Court
must recognize that Matter of Soram fails to account for modern statutes that criminalize
behavior which would never have been considered child abuse at the time the “crime of
child abuse” deportability ground was enacted. Accepted parenting styles that teach
children independence and self-reliance do not re ect the type of conduct that Congress
intended to label child abuse, neglect, or abandonment.
Violent crimes that necessarily results in a child’s injury should be condemned, but
conduct that does not cause harm to a child must not result in removal. The deportation of
a parent, guardian, or caretaker for the crime of child abuse deportability ground breaks
up families; ironically, it then becomes the source of serious and lasting harm to children.
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have an opportunity to return the reach of
the crime of child abuse to the deportability ground’s original purpose. Once the  aws of
Matter of Soram are rejected, that realignment is possible.
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We need to get the #FAIRAct through the Senate—but until that happens, it's up to states
to respond to the forced arbitration crisis. Fantastic new @HarvardCRCL post from
@BennJennett & @daveyseligman on how states can take action.
#EndForcedArbitration
https://harvardcrcl.org/sunshine-is-not-enough-state-respons...
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Still hoping that courts will revive a general liberty or expression right to student dress
freedom as @djuna22 and I advocated in @HarvardCRCL. In the meantime, Equal
Protection, Free Exercise, and compelled speech doing a decent job policing the
boundaries of gov’t overreach.
https://twitter.com/galenleigh/status/1199442702582059008
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As someone who used to assist accused students in Title IX proceedings, I think I’m in a
good position to say that DeVos’s “due process” regs are unnecessary and dangerous.
When they were proposed, I wrote about it for @HarvardCRCL’s blog:
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Another thing to be thankful for this week: declaratory judgment  nding that the
provision of Charter Day School dress code requiring girls to wear skirts violates
Equal Protection, & order permanently enjoining the school from establishing or
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CR-CL's annual HLS Ames Final Live-blog is LIVE with blow-by-blow commentary by Nicole
Franklin as the student competitors face-o  before a panel of judges, including Judge
Merrick Garland! https://harvardcrcl.org/2019-ames-moot-court- nals-live-blog/.
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In light of today's  nding against the Trump foundation, I've written a post for the
@HarvardCRCL Amicus blog on the importance of transparency in ideological nonpro ts.
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We are expecting @BetsyDeVosED’s  nal regulations on Title IX and sexual
harassment within the month. Based on the previously published proposed rules, we
have good reason to think they will be bad.
David Fahrenthold @Fahrenthold
BREAKING: @realdonaldtrump ordered to pay $2M in damages for misusing a
charity’s money — using it to buy portraits of himself, pay legal settlements, and help
his 2016 campaign. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-ordered-to-pay-
2-million-to-charities-over-misuse-of-foundation-court-documents-
say/2019/11/07/b8f804e2-018e-11ea-9518-1e76abc088b6_story.html
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Great to talk with @HarvardCRCL (where I was a sta er 30 years ago -- oy) about the
LGBTQ discrimination cases before SCOTUS
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For @HarvardCRCL, @emilythemorrow and I spoke to James Esseks of the @ACLU LGBT
& HIV Project about his thoughts coming out of oral argument for the Title VII LGBTQ
cases before the Supreme Court https://harvardcrcl.org/taking-liberties-episode-9/
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